-Tonia M. Harris OCR-USDC/EDVA 703-646-1438-

1 PROCEEDINGS 2 (Court proceedings commenced at 1:36 p.m.) 3 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Good afternoon, Judge. 4 THE COURT: Good afternoon, Tanya. You may call the 5 next case. THE DEPUTY CLERK: The Court calls civil case 6 7 Matthew Souter versus C.T. Irby, et al. Case No. 2020-cv-1295. May I have appearances, please, first for the 8 plaintiff. 10 MR. GLASBERG: Good morning, Judge. This is Vick 11 Glasberg representing the plaintiff. I'm with my associate, 12 Nicki Rodriguez, and I will be arguing this afternoon. 13 THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon, Mr. Glasberg. And who is on for the defendant or defendants? 14 15 MR. KRONE: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 16 Philip Krone on behalf of the defendants. 17 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Francuzenko is not 18 around?

MR. KRONE: It will just be me today.

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THE COURT: All right. I'm sure you can handle it.

All right. This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment, although, the plaintiff is seeking summary judgment on liability only. And we're doing this by telephone. I'm not going to do these by telephone in the future, but I'm still in a sort of pandemic mode. So

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we're going to proceed as follows:

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We're going to begin, since there are cross-motions with you, Mr. Glasberg, and I want to begin with a recitation of a few facts and I want to focus on the first three claims you make in your complaint, the 1983 claims. That's what I want to focus on at this time. So I understand that Mr. Souter was arrested and that he's complaining about the arrest warrant, he's complaining about the mode of the arrest, and he's complaining about the arrest in general under 1983. I understand all of that. And the facts, as I understand them, Mr. Glasberg, are that Mr. Souter owns an old farmhouse in The Plains, Virginia and he has a tenant, Ms. Johnson and he wanted her to leave. After serving her with a notice to quit for various violations of their lease, he secured an ex parte emergency protective order pursuant to 19.2-152.8 which relates to committing acts of violence, force, or threat, or criminal offenses resulting in injury to Ms. Johnson or her property.

Now, then what happened is that she called the -that was an ex parte order, and after getting the order, the
next day she called the sheriff's office because Mr. Souter
had cut off her electricity to her bedroom and the water to
her bathroom, in her view, violating the EPO. And thereafter,
although there was an effort to call Mr. Souter, there was
never any contact with Mr. Souter and ultimately defendant

Gray obtained a -- not Gray -- Jacobs obtained an arrest warrant.

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Now he did so, even though he had, as I understand it, possession of the emergency protective order and he had read it. He took it to a magistrate, who Mr. Glasberg goes out of his way to remind me that they're not lawyers in our antiquated Virginia process, he took it to a magistrate and got an arrest warrant and said that the disruption of the utilities was a criminal breach of the protective order, and then an arrest warrant issued. They went out, arrested Mr. Souter. I don't know what the other deputies knew. just know that Jacobs, to whom the plaintiff made a complaint, didn't talk to Souter either, tried to reach him but was unsuccessful. He had a copy of the emergency protective order. He took it to a magistrate to secure an arrest warrant. I don't know what the magistrate did, but they also used the data source that the sheriff's office has at Fauquier County that apparently did not have the full text of the EPO.

I don't know if there is any dispute at all as to those facts, Mr. Glasberg. Let me hear first from you. Do you have any dispute of the facts I recited?

MR. GLASBERG: No dispute. I would just clarify two points, if I may. The arrest warrant that was secured recited the incorrect basis for the protective order. And that is not a technical irrelevant fact because the incorrectly cited

protective order provision, which is under 16.1 instead of 19.2, does provide, under certain circumstances, for interference with utilities. That was not the statute that was invoked to get this protective order. It was a misstatement. So the magistrate was given incorrect information as to the legal basis for the contention that it was a violation of the order in the first place. That's the first point.

- The second point that I would want to point out is, and you have the record references in the briefs, and I'll be happy to review them with you, but all three of the arresting officers profess complete knowledge of the protective order. Deputy Jacobs, because as you have correctly said, he procured it and he read it before he went to the -- to the magistrate. Sergeant McCauley, on his own account, read it and was fully familiar with it. And on his account, Deputy Irby served such orders. The quotation, I think, is "dozens of times." This is a form order. It's a template.
- So it's not only Jacobs who can be and should be charged with a complete knowledge of what is and is not permissible under that order, but all three deputies. Apart from that, Judge, you have all the facts as is always the case.
- 24 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Glasberg.
 25 Let's go to Mr. Krone. Those facts are all undisputed, aren't

1 they?

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MR. KRONE: The facts that you set forth are. I

don't believe the record set forth the defendant's knowledge

as clearly as Mr. Glasberg has stated their knowledge

regarding the protective order that was served on the

plaintiff as well as the arrest warrant that was executed.

And so all three defendants acknowledge it. But the facts as

you stated, I believe, are not in dispute.

THE COURT: What do you contend was Jacobs knowledge of the protective order?

MR. KRONE: Jacob's knowledge, I believe, as put, of

course, in the record, started with reviewing the -- and I sometimes get acronyms wrong -- the VCIN program, which indicated notes as to what the protective order was. And in a sequencing did that prior to obtaining the copy of the protective order which he then brought forth to the magistrate.

THE COURT: All right. Did Jacobs have the emergency protective order which cited 19.2-152.8?

MR. KRONE: When he went before the magistrate? He did.

22 THE COURT: Whenever.

MR. KRONE: When he went before the magistrate, he

24 did.

25 THE COURT: So he read it then?

1 MR. KRONE: That is, yes, his testimony. 2 THE COURT: And so as far as Jacobs is concerned, he 3 knew that 19.2-152.8 applied only to threats of violence and 4 the sort, not utilities? Is that correct, Mr. Krone? MR. KRONE: He would have known that -- that the 5 6 form that he had was for the 19.2 not the 16. However, I do 7 say that he also went in with that knowledge of having additional information from the VCIN system. 8 THE COURT: All right. I'll come to the VCIN 10 system, but I'll give you a forecast, Mr. Krone. The VCIN system is not likely to save anybody in 11 12 this case. You've got the actual EPO. That's what matters. 13 If somebody enters from the sheriff's department or the police 14 department or wherever, inaccurate or insufficient 15 information, that's not going to save it. But I'll let you 16 arque that later. 17 Let's go now to -- that was Jacobs. Let's go to the 18 second person. McCauley. Let's see. 19 What did McCauley know, Mr. Krone? 20 MR. KRONE: So McCauley had served the protective

order the night before and had explained to it and explained to the plaintiff that he needed to understand it and that was

23 | the night prior to --

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THE COURT: So --

MR. KRONE: He testified that he did not look at the

- 1 order again after the warrant had been procured.
- 2 THE COURT: Well, all right, but that could be his
- 3 problem, Mr. Krone.
- In any event, he knew or should have known that the
- 5 | EPO was based on 19.2-152.8 not 16 -- or it's the other way
- 6 around.
- 7 MR. KRONE: No, you said it correctly.
- 8 THE COURT: That it was issued under 19.2-152.8, not
- 9 under 16.2-253. He knew that. Now, let's go to the last
- 10 person.
- How about Irby?
- MR. KRONE: Irby assisted when McCauley was there.
- 13 | So he was present while McCauley spoke to the plaintiff but
- 14 that is it.
- 15 THE COURT: All right. So they get this arrest
- 16 | warrant because they erroneously believe or represent to the
- 17 | magistrate that it's based on 16.2-253 when it's, in fact,
- 18 | based on 19.2-152.8.
- 19 Is that right, Mr. Glasberg?
- MR. GLASBERG: Yes, sir.
- 21 THE COURT: All right. Now, Mr. Krone, is that
- 22 right?
- MR. KRONE: The arrest warrant is based on the 16.2
- 24 | statute. The record before the Court does not -- it doesn't
- 25 | state McCauley's review of the arrest warrant or knowledge

- regarding the form and any information provided to the 1 2 magistrate. Same as to -- as to the Deputy Irby who was asked 3 to come along for other reasons.
- THE COURT: All right. You have a different view, 4 5 Mr. Glasberg?
 - MR. GLASBERG: Yes, sir. Both McCauley and Irby testified under oath that they were knowledgeable of the terms of the order and I have submitted that to the Court at ECF 24-3 being a portion of McCauley's testimony. And permit me to quote very briefly. This is McCauley on page 24, starting at line 6. "I remember reading the protective order over with Mr. Souter explaining it to him and advising him that any violation of the protective order could result in the arrest for violation of the protective order."
 - "QUESTION: Okay. Now, as we saw, the protective order has two pages. One saying what the subject of the order can or cannot do and on the second page there are definitions and further explanations of that; is that so?"
- 19 "ANSWER: Yes, sir.

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- "QUESTION: And you reviewed all of that so you were satisfied that he understood his obligations under the 22 protective order?
- 23 "ANSWER: I even asked him if he understood it.
- 2.4 "QUESTION: Okay. And did he tell you that he did?
- 25 "ANSWER: Yes, sir."

- Okay, that's McCauley. And as for -- let me just bring it up on the screen, Judge.
- 3 "ANSWER: As for Irby, he was there throughout and on 4 his own testimony...
- 5 Hang on.
- 6 (A pause in the proceedings.)
- THE COURT: Mr. Glasberg, I thought you were old enough to use a paper, rather than a screen.
- 9 MR. GLASBERG: Well, you know, I always use paper
 10 and I never use a screen, and I find that I didn't make a
 11 photocopy of the exhibits to my briefs, but I will represent
 12 to you that he stood there and -- okay, well, here I can find.
 13 This is document 24-4.
- "QUESTION: Were you there when McCauley explained the terms of the order to Matt?
- 16 "ANSWER: Yes."

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- And I will represent to you, Judge, and I know it's in the record, and I will find it before this hearing is over or later send it to you, in which he said that he had served such orders, quote, dozens, end quote, of times.
- And again, these are not -- these are not unique orders drawn for the occasion. They're form orders and the judge takes off whatever is appropriate in his views within the confines that are available under that particular type of order. And this type of order has nothing to do with

- 1 utilities and this is the type of order that Irby had served
- 2 dozens of times. So that's actually the only -- I didn't
- 3 | realize that was a fact in dispute, but I think the record is
- 4 | clear that Irby was full well aware of the content and the
- 5 | thrust of the protective order and --
- 6 THE COURT: That's fine, Mr. Glasberg. I
- 7 understand. In the interest of the finite or fine institute
- 8 of life, let's go on.
- 9 MR. GLASBERG: Yes, sir.
- 10 THE COURT: Am I correct, Mr. Glasberg, that you
- 11 | contend that the -- that the warrant was erroneously obtained
- 12 by misrepresenting to the magistrate that a different statute
- 13 | was involved? The warrant was issued under 19.2 instead of
- 14 | 16.2, and it should have been 16.2.
- 15 What is the mistake and who made the mistake,
- 16 Mr. Glasberg?
- 17 MR. GLASBERG: In the first instance Deputy Jacobs
- 18 | made the mistake. He was acquainted with the order. He
- 19 | should have known that the order had nothing to do with
- 20 utilities, and that a complaint of a problem with the
- 21 utilities. He should have handled it the same way that his
- 22 | colleague did, who got the same call from Ms. Johnson earlier
- 23 | in the day.
- 24 As you may recall from the brief and from the
- 25 | deposition testimony, I believe his name was Young (ph). She

called him and he wanted to speak to Souter. He said there
could be, I think, I'm quoting, a thousand reasons why
electricity would have gone off. This is, as you noted, an
old house the utilities are problematical at best. So in the
first instance, Jacobs should have known that the protective
order that had been procured and served on Matt Souter simply
did not cover the alleged disruption with the utilities.

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- Secondly, in preparing the order, he should have -I mean it might have precluded the magistrate from entering
 the -- from providing the arrest warrant if he had provided
 the correct statutory reference. Because under the 16.2,
 there may be a basis for proceeding, but there is none under
 the 19.2. So I would fault him on those two grounds, Judge.
- THE COURT: All right. To distill what you've said, Mr. Glasberg, it is the sheriffs, the deputies, who made the mistake, not the magistrate?
- MR. GLASBERG: You know, in our system, we don't know what is told to the magistrate but that certainly seems to be the case.
- THE COURT: All right. Now, Mr. Krone, clearly a mistake was made, don't you agree?
- MR. KRONE: There's a wrong form that was used and information that likely wasn't correct that was obtained, so, yes.
- 25 THE COURT: All right. So as you say a wrong form

- 1 | was used, a mistake was made. Who made it, Mr. Krone?
- 2 MR. KRONE: I believe that Deputy Jacobs had
- 3 | information that was -- that would have been violative of a
- 4 | certain protective order. It's just the wrong information.
- 5 And he brought that before the magistrate and was -- was told
- 6 he was okay.
- 7 THE COURT: All right. So what you're saying is
- 8 Jacobs made a mistake and you concede that, don't you,
- 9 Mr. Krone?
- 10 MR. KRONE: He made a decision based on incorrect
- 11 | information. He made a mistake of fact.
- 12 THE COURT: He made a mistake? Am I right,
- 13 Mr. Krone?
- MR. KRONE: You're right.
- 15 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Let's go on.
- 16 | Now, let's cover this bit about the claim by your clients,
- 17 | Mr. Krone, that they consulted a legal -- or not a legal, a
- 18 | law enforcement database, VICN [sic], or whatever it's called.
- And what's the relevance of that, in your view,
- 20 Mr. Krone?
- 21 MR. KRONE: The relevance of that would be that as
- 22 | Deputy Jacobs is responding to the complaint from Ms. Johnson.
- 23 | He doesn't have the protective order in front of him and he --
- 24 | and it's their first step is they pull it up and run it, run
- 25 | the names through the system, and that's where he obtained the

- 1 information about the protective order which came across as
- 2 | the subject may not interfere with the protected person, which
- 3 under the information he possessed from the -- the
- 4 | complainant, Ms. Johnson, came across as a violation of the
- 5 order.
- 6 THE COURT: All right. Now, Mr. Krone, he did have
- 7 | the actual EPO so he knew that that information from the VICN
- 8 [sic], or whatever it's called, was not entirely accurate in
- 9 this particular circumstance.
- 10 Is that right?
- MR. KRONE: Well, he obtained it after he prepared
- 12 | to go in front of the magistrate so he brought it so he can
- 13 present it to the magistrate.
- 14 THE COURT: All right, so, and I assume he read it
- 15 | and knew it was based on 19.2-152.8, rather than 16.2-253,
- 16 right?
- 17 MR. KRONE: I don't believe his testimony -- his
- 18 testimony clarified whether or not he made that connection.
- 19 THE COURT: Well, how about this, and you agree he
- 20 | should have made that connection?
- 21 MR. KRONE: I agree that it is possible, but I can't
- 22 | say that he made the connection.
- 23 | THE COURT: All right. Well, I guess what I'm
- 24 | getting at is I've looked at this with some effort to
- 25 | understand what happened. Clearly a mistake was made by these

deputies. They went and got an arrest warrant on the basis of a misunderstanding as to what the EPO covered. And the magistrate wasn't fully informed, presumably. And I'm unclear, Mr. Krone, why you think qualified immunity has anything in the world to do with this. They made a mistake, they shouldn't have made the mistake, it has nothing to do with unclear law. It has nothing to do with the situation where a law enforcement officer has to exercise judgment in a particular situation that the law hasn't covered. This is a straightforward sort of thing where you read an EPO and consider whether a violation has occurred and seek a warrant based on the right statute. He didn't do that. So tell me why you think qualified immunity has anything whatever to do with this case.

MR. KRONE: To start, there are three deputies involved and there are distinct sets of facts that apply to each of them. As it relates to Deputy Jacobs, again, the argument, and why it's related to qualified immunity, would be that he had a mistake of fact. He had read the VCIN, got the information that it was not to interfere with a protected person, which isn't completely irrelevant, it would make sense and be reasonable under the 16.2 statute, and the mistake occurs when he does that under mistake of fact. Qualified immunity is and still apply with mistake of fact and mistake of law. Here --

- THE COURT: But he --
- 2 MR. KRONE: -- happened because of a mistake of

3 | fact.

- 4 THE COURT: Mr. Krone, Mr. Krone?
- 5 MR. KRONE: Yes.
- THE COURT: How could be possibly make that mistake if he had in his possession the EPO that cited 19.2 not 16.2?
- 8 You can't make that mistake. You can't be excused for making
- 9 that mistake if you have the EPO that says 19.2 and -- I'm
- 10 sorry -- that says 16 -- I'm sorry, it says 19.2, and he knows
- 11 | that the protective order, if it relates to utilities, would
- 12 say 16.2. And the utilities is what this woman was
- 13 | complaining about.
- 14 It's one thing to make a mistake of law or fact, but
- 15 | this isn't a mistake, this is a blunder. Isn't it?
- MR. KRONE: Well, the mistake, as you put it, the
- 17 | "blunder," occurs after he's made the mistake, and he's
- 18 | already -- he's taken in the information from the complainant,
- 19 Ms. Johnson, and then he -- which is, again, the
- 20 misinformation that the subject may not interfere with a
- 21 protected person. He puts together the affidavit and then
- 22 grabs the emergency protective order and goes to the
- 23 | magistrate.
- Those circumstances are, again, limited to Deputy
- 25 | Jacobs which the circumstances are different for McCauley and

Deputy Irby.

THE COURT: All right. So it's Jacobs, isn't it, who inserts in the order submitted for the magistrate to approve that it's an order under 19.2-152.8, right? He's the one that does that? And you're telling me he does that because he looks at the VICN [sic] database and it just says "interfering with a person."

MR. KRONE: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Well, it probably is not charitable of me to characterize that as a blunder, but he had the EPO or he ultimately had the EPO and he ultimately read it and he knew that the complaint of this person related to 16.2, but this EPO was only 152 -- 19.2-152.8. So that's the mistake that I'm focussing on, Mr. Krone.

And let me ask you one further question on qualified immunity. Did you, in your brief, cite any circuit opinion that you think is closely on point, factually, to this case, that says qualified immunity protects these officers from this mistake?

MR. KRONE: I did not cite a circuit. I did cite district court. The *Guerrero v. Deane* case, which I think is extremely applicable, especially Deputy Irby and Corporal McCauley, as it relates to whether or not they were under a responsibility to conduct their own investigation as to what — as to what information and the process that Deputy

1 | Jacobs undertook to get the arrest warrant.

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THE COURT: Tell me briefly what the facts of that case were.

MR. KRONE: In *Guerrero v. Deane*, there was an officer responding to a house and he had called for backup and the officers here that are related that are most in connection with Deputy Irby and Corporal McCauley, arrived to the house where they come across — the officer asked for — called for backup, has his foot and leg in the doorway of the house, and they come up to a scene where it appears the person is closing the door on the officer.

So when they come up to the scene, they see this happening and it's -- they're relying on what they're perceiving, not necessarily what the Court determined is -- whether or not the original officer unlawfully entered. You know so in this case the responding officers aren't the ones who were involved in any potential unlawful entry, so when they get to the scene what they do is -- isn't unconstitutional. They have something else going on here. We have Deputy Irby and Corporal McCauley. Corporal McCauley, Jacobs tells them he has the arrest warrant. He says, "Okay. We're going to have multiple people go out because there's an alert on the premises for the plaintiff." He asked Deputy Irby to come.

And what I was mentioning before was opposing

counsel was talking about how they had been aware of the terms 1 of the order, there's no evidence before the Court right now 2 3 about them reading the arrest warrant or looking over the arrest warrant that Deputy Jacobs obtained. They received 4 5 that information from Deputy Jacobs that they had an arrest 6 So when they get -- when they show up, they don't 7 have the same information as to the protective order. While Corporal McCauley had read it the day before, that was a day 8 before. He had testified that he did not believe he had seen 10 a copy of it when they went to execute the arrest warrant. 11 While Deputy Irby was present when Corporal McCauley explained 12 it. Again, neither of them recall reading it again prior to executing the arrest warrant. So their actions are based on 13 14 what they are being provided by Deputy Jacobs.

THE COURT: I thought --

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MR. KRONE: Even if the Court determines there's a violation there, it's not the fruit of the poisonous tree. It doesn't get to be used in a civil instance to -- as a sword to impose liability on other officers who didn't take it on their own to complete another investigation of what information that they've been provided by another officer.

THE COURT: Mr. Glasberg, you agree with that characterization of what the other officers knew, Jacobs and McCauley?

MR. GLASBERG: No, sir.

1 THE COURT: Or not Jacobs.

MR. GLASBERG: Permit me, however, just to clarify with regards to Jacobs. Here is his testimony. It's at 26 -- ECF 24-6. Just to make it absolutely clear.

"QUESTION: Did you read the protective order before giving it to the magistrate?

"ANSWER: Yes.

"QUESTION: So you gave the magistrate Exhibit 10 which is a protective order on Exhibit 11, which is your criminal complaint, is that correct?

"ANSWER: Yes.

So there isn't any question that Jacobs absolutely positively knew what was in the protective order.

Now, we get to the interesting fact. The protective order was served the day before by, guess who? McCauley and Irby. They were the ones who served the protective order.

McCauley read it to Souter. Irby heard it. It was all there and they went -- they went the next day to arrest him for having violated the protective order. That's indubitable.

It's obviously what happened. The notion that they were there, you know, because he was getting arrested for bank robbery or for murder or for something else is a complete fantasy. They were there because he had allegedly violated the protective order. Jacobs got the warrant and it was a warrant to arrest Souter for having allegedly violated the

protective order which fewer than 24 hours before McCauley and Irby had procured and served on Jacobs.

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So I would respectfully submit that there is a abundant evidence on the basis on which this Court can properly charge all three arresting officers with knowledge that the arrest was not a permissible arrest given the scope of the protective order and the alleged offenses.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Glasberg your client did shut off the utilities and --

MR. GLASBERG: No, sir. Well, because there's no evidence that he did and he has -- he didn't do that, Judge. He didn't shut off the utilities. That is certainly what she claimed and I don't dispute the fact that she made the claim. He did no such thing. What happened -- we're not here to debate facts, but I just put it in the memo in a footnote. After being served with the order, he said he was going to do absolutely nothing. I'm not going to go near Melissa Johnson. He left early the next morning and came back about an hour before he was arrested. He was helping a friend buy a car. He shut off no water, he shut off no electricity. The electricity goes off all the time because the electrical system they have there and the bathroom wasn't functioning, and everyone was using the other bathroom.

So this is a factual matter and I don't believe that it bears on the adjudication of this motion, but no he did

- not -- he took no steps to adversely affect anyones utilities in the house. And there were other -- there was another tenant in the house, by the way.
 - THE COURT: Mr. Glasberg, let me ask you this question. It might help clarify things.

What do you think should have happened in this case?

Let's assume that Miss, whatever her name is, I've forgotten

her name is, Johnson, let's assume she lost water and

utilities in her bathroom and let's assume she mistakenly

thought that was a violation of the emergency protective order

and she called the deputies.

What should have happened, Mr. Glasberg?

MR. GLASBERG: I don't think it has to be a hypothetical answer. We know what should have happened. It's what happened when she spoke with Deputy White. She spoke to Deputy White and that's laid out in my memo in support of the summary judgment motion with Deputy White's testimony. He received her information. He then tried to reach Souter, who was out. He was helping a friend buy a car because he didn't want to stick around where Johnson was. When I asked him why did he want to speak to Souter, I mean it's an obvious question, he gave an obvious answer.

"QUESTION: It could be a thousand different reasons why the power was out, but I like to do the full portion of the investigation to try to figure out why the power was out

to talk to the landlord about that."

That ends the quote. It's at a footnote on page 4 of my memo. And he tried to put in some calls and he couldn't reach Souter because Souter wasn't there. The only reason this ended up in Jacobs lap was that there was a change in shift. So that when Melissa Johnson called again, White wasn't there and he didn't follow up. So what should have happened is exactly what White said. He said that he also testified, and I think I have it in the record as well. Yes, that's right. He said "I was trying to get a civil agreement to have the power restored." That is not knowing if it had been done deliberatively or by accident in this old house. He wanted to resolve it in the way in which it could be done without invoking criminal -- the provisions of the criminal code.

Unfortunately, he went off duty and then the call came and Officer Jacobs did not see fit to proceed that way. He said he thought that he may have called Souter to find out what happened. But then on consulting his records, he saw that there was no reference of such a call and he acknowledged that if he had made a call he would ordinarily have put it in his record, so he testified. This is at Exhibit 6 at page 79. He testified that making a call "Something I would document in my incident report, but it's not in my report that I attempted to do so." So he didn't do that. He didn't do what White

did. So that's why I stated that what should have been done is in fact what was done by White, but then it fell into the hands of other deputies.

THE COURT: Mr. Glasberg, where or how did the magistrate judge or the magistrate -- why did the magistrate issue an arrest warrant under 16.2- -- no, under 19.2-152.8. In other words, where did the magistrate get that citation from? Is that a form that Jacobs gave to him?

MR. GLASBERG: Yes. Well, I cannot tell you that.

I don't know if he gave him -- let me think, I'm trying to remember. Whatever it is --

MR. GLASBERG: No, sir, no, sir. The warrant list the incorrect statute. So either that was provided directly by Jacobs or Jacobs told it to the magistrate who filled it out, I believe. And I'll have to check the deposition, Judge, I'm sorry. I know a lot of the facts but not every single one. I believe that warrants of this sort are filled out, at least in terms of the pro forma information, are filled out by the reporting officer and given to the judge or the magistrate to sign off and indicate what provisions will be enforced. I believe that it was Jacobs who put in the 16.1, but if he didn't, then he would have told that to the magistrate, because there are different warrants. And a warrant under

16.1 might conceivably be invalid for this type of offense.

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- 1 what the -- the offense, the offense in Section 16 is
- 2 | violating the EPO. But that EPO -- that -- let me make it
- 3 | clear, if I may, Judge. That only refers to the 16. You
- 4 | can't get an arrest warrant under 16.1-253.2 for a violation
- 5 of 19.2.
- 6 THE COURT: All right. What I'm going to do is
- 7 | this, I'm going to take a brief recess and I'll give you each
- 8 | about five to ten minutes to give me whatever else you want to
- 9 tell me about the motions for summary judgment that are at
- 10 | issue and you need not repeat what we've gone through, but you
- 11 | certainly may address anything. And we'll start with you,
- 12 Mr. Glasberg. And I am only interested in the 1983 claims at
- 13 | this time.
- 14 So let me take a brief recess and I'll come back.
- 15 Tanya, can you remove me?
- 16 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Will do, Judge.
- 17 (A short break was taken.)
- 18 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Okay, everyone, Judge Ellis is on
- 19 his way back into the hearing.
- Judge, you're back into the hearing.
- 21 THE COURT: Thank you, Tanya. I am back. And I
- 22 | have an additional question and then I want to give you each
- 23 | an opportunity to tell me anything you wish to tell me
- 24 | focussing on counts or claims 1 through 3, the 1983 claims.
- 25 | But the first thing I want to be clear and confirm, I've now

- 1 looked at the arrest warrant and confirm that the arrest
- 2 | warrant cites 16.1. And my question to you, first,
- 3 Mr. Glasberg is, who filled in that 16.1, the magistrate or
- 4 | the officer seeking the warrant, or do you know?
- 5 MR. GLASBERG: I believe it was Jacobs and I
- 6 | will have to confirm that, but that's what I believe to be the
- 7 case.
- 8 THE COURT: All right. Do you know, Mr. Krone?
- 9 MR. KRONE: I cannot say for certain whether it was
- 10 | the magistrate or Jacobs, Your Honor.
- MR. GLASBERG: Well, we are going to try to look it
- 12 up in the transcript, Judge.
- 13 THE COURT: That will be useful for me to have in
- 14 | mind. What I'm going to do is take the matter under
- 15 | advisement. I will say this much and then I'm going to give
- 16 | you each about ten minutes to tell me anything else you want
- 17 | to tell me because I don't want to preclude either of you from
- 18 | having a full opportunity to be heard. But it seems to me
- 19 | that this was a series of mistakes made chiefly by the
- 20 defendants, and in that regard, chiefly by Jacobs.
- 21 I don't have any doubt that all three of the
- 22 defendants knew what the EPO said and the EPO would have been
- 23 | an EPO issued pursuant to 19.2, not 16.1 or 2. So they would
- 24 | have known that the shutting off of the utilities was not an
- 25 | act of violence, force, or threat, or criminal offense. And

so getting an arrest warrant on that basis was just a mistake, and it's a mistake no officer should make. I don't see any basis for qualified immunity, but I'm going to think about it some more, Mr. Krone. The case you cite, the foot in the door case by Judge Cacheris, that's, of course, a case that relies further on what those officers or backup officers observed at the scene. None of that is true here.

But having said that, I now want to give you an opportunity, one at a time, we'll begin with you, Mr. Krone, to tell me anything else that isn't in your brief that you think I should know as I consider and reflect on this.

You go first, Mr. Krone.

MR. KRONE: Thank you, Your Honor. I did want to clarify one thing that was mentioned. It stated that McCauley and Irby procured their emergency protective order. We're talking about shift changes again. There is a shift change when they got put on. They were provided a protective order to be served, McCauley was, and asked for Irby to come along.

In the *Guerrero* case that I discussed, they cite to another district court case, the *Ware v. James City County* for the proposition, again, that they weren't -- the other officers weren't required to conduct an independent investigation. The *Ware* case, which wasn't fully briefed at all in the brief, that involves officers who were actually on the scene hours before the ultimate incident where another

officer responded and then called for backup.

And again, here McCauley and Irby aren't the arresting officers. There's a day in-between them serving this protective order and then receiving information that there's, you know, that there's been a complaint that has been violated and that an arrest warrant has been served.

As it relates to qualified immunity, I don't believe it's clear that Irby or McCauley was under an obligation to double check the arrest warrant or to double check the emergency protective order. And they took action based on the information they were provided. Under the -- it's a fact Irby arrived at the scene and was not -- was not amongst the conversation as it was to the arrest warrant until he saw the conversation become physical, in which case he then proceeded to come up to McCauley, the plaintiff, and Jacobs.

THE COURT: What do you mean it became physical?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ KRONE: When they went to arrest him -- when they arrested him.

THE COURT: What do you mean it became physical?

MR. KRONE: When they grabbed his arm to put him in handcuffs and he pulled away.

THE COURT: And then what happened?

MR. KRONE: Irby saw him -- observed the plaintiff being noncompliant and then he was at the gate and came forward to where the other officers and the plaintiff were.

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              THE COURT: All right. Answer this question,
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    Mr. Krone, you represent all three defendants, Jacob, Irby,
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    and McCauley, right?
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              MR. KRONE:
                          Yes.
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              THE COURT: Now, they are sued in their official or
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    individual capacities?
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              MR. KRONE: They are sued in their individual
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    capacities?
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              THE COURT: Is that right, Mr. Glasberg?
              MR. GLASBERG: Yes. This is individual capacity
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    only.
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              THE COURT: All right. Now, if there were a
    judgment, Mr. Krone, issued against those two individuals, who
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    pays the judgment? The sheriffs, the Department, or the
    individuals?
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16 MR. KRONE: Well, they are covered by the program 17 through the Virginia Treasury.

18 THE COURT: All right. That's helpful. Thank you.

19 Do you have anything else you want me to know,

20 Mr. Krone?

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MR. KRONE: No, I believe the Guerrero case and the Ware case are on point for qualified immunity. You know in regards to whether there's a clearly established law, you know, that they had to investigate the information before them. And outside of the brief and what's already been

discussed, I just think I would be repeating myself as it relates to Deputy Jacobs. That is all.

- THE COURT: All right. All right. It's your turn,

 Mr. Glasberg.
 - MR. GLASBERG: Thank you, Judge. I don't believe Guerrero bears on this case at all. There's no question here about charging these deputies with the need to make an independent investigation or to second guess anybody. They affirmatively had knowledge of the problem at issue. They didn't have to investigate. They are charged with that knowledge. They served the two of them served the protective order and the next day went to Jacobs and recited the protective order. That's all, I believe, in the record.

I do want to address one point that you asked,

Judge, which I didn't have the deposition page in front of me,

but I do now. And I will tell you that both McCauley and Irby

testified that they were aware that the warrant was for

violation of the protective order. It's in Deputy Irby's

testimony at page -- page 26, lines 15 through 19.

"The arrest was for violation of a protective order that had been fairly recently obtained, is that correct?"

"Yes." That's Irby.

And the same is available from -- forgive me -- from McCauley. If I can only find it, which I can't. But I represent to you, Judge, that McCauley was a superior officer

in this matter. When Jacobs determined to serve the arrest warrant that he had obtained, he went to his supervisor and advised him that he was going to serve this arrest warrant for violation of the protective order and McCauley said that he would go with him and that he should get Irby to go as well, and I can provide and will provide the record reference to that.

I think that that's pretty much it, Judge. I believe that each of these three officers are properly charged with knowledge of the protective order. They are properly charged with knowledge of what the alleged violation was of the protective order. They are all properly charged with knowledge that the alleged violation violated no protective order that had been imposed on Mr. Souter. They are all chargeable with knowledge that the arrest warrant they got was predicated on the wrong statute, that it involved a claim of criminal conduct that was not tenable under the statute or under the protective order that had been served the day before.

So I believe that they're all equally culpable.

Deputy Jacobs for having procured the arrest warrant and the other two for having knowingly -- fully knowingly participated in the arrest and the incidents of the arrest which did, unfortunately, involve some physical behavior that's not before the Court right now. But these circumstances rendered

- the arrest of unreasonable, I respectably submit, as a matter of law for which reason the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on liability should be granted.
 - THE COURT: Mr. Glasberg, let me ask once again so that I'm clear. I think you've answered it before but I want to be clear.

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- The arrest warrant cites 16.2-253 or 16.1? Who gave the magistrate that citation or did the magistrate himself -
 I'm sorry, or did the magistrate himself put in that statute?

 MR. GLASBERG: I think I can tell you definitively that it was information that was provided by Jacobs. Either he told it to the magistrate or if we look on the affidavit --
- THE COURT: He should have -- Jacobs should have submitted an affidavit in support of the arrest warrant, right?
- MR. GLASBERG: Well, unfortunately --

a moment please for me to find it.

- 18 THE COURT: Not the way it happens in the state
 19 system, I know. It often doesn't happen that way.
- MR. GLASBERG: Well, I think that you need an
 affidavit for a search warrant, Judge. I don't think you need
 one for an arrest warrant.
- THE COURT: No, you're right, that's correct.
- MR. GLASBERG: Hang on. I'm going to have an answer
 for you in a second, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. Let me be clear. My question was: How did the information of 16.1 or 16.2 get to the form or get to the arrest warrant? Did it come from Jacobs or did it come from the magistrate?

Now, what you've told me so far is that either came from Jacobs orally or he, in fact, filled it in in the arrest warrant.

MR. GLASBERG: I'm looking at the criminal complaint, Judge, and I do not see an identification of any particular statute. Simply that there was a protective order served. I spoke with Melissa Johnson. She told me that -- after Matthew was served with a protective order -- here we go.

All right. So without my -- without my associate,

Judge, I get nothing right. I'm looking at it now. It's

Exhibit 11 to the deposition of Jacobs. And in the lower

right-hand corner what appears in 16.1-253.1, violation of

protective order. So that's on the criminal complaint that

was submitted by Jacobs to the magistrate and I expect that

that is what the magistrate relied on in reciting the same

statute on his -- on the warrant. Although, the warrant might

have been prepared in full by Jacobs. He didn't recall

whether he wrote the warrant, the arrest warrant or the

magistrate did. But we do have him saying in his criminal

complaint, we do have a reference in the criminal complaint to

1 | 16.1.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Krone, do you have anything you want to add to that information?

MR. KRONE: Real quick, Judge. Victor you said in the criminal complaint it reference 16.1?

MR. GLASBERG: Yeah, if you look at Exhibit 11 to the Jacobs deposition, you'll see it at the lower right.

THE COURT: I'll give you a moment.

MR. KRONE: In his deposition, when asked by counsel about his criminal complaint, he says, and it's on page 50 of his deposition that he drafted it. And then the question was:

"QUESTION: And then, "he" being the magistrate,
issued the arrest warrant?"

I don't think -- I don't think there's a clear indication whether or not the arrest warrant was actually typed out by Deputy Jacobs, especially since all the other forms by Deputy Jacobs were handwritten and the arrest warrant is typed.

THE COURT: Well, it wouldn't matter, would it

Mr. Krone, if the magistrate relied on the information, mainly

16.1, that Jacobs gave him?

In other words, it doesn't matter whether Jacobs did the arrest warrant or not, if the magistrate used the information to fill out -- if the magistrate did it, he used the information that Deputy Jacobs gave him.

MR. KRONE: Correct. And that's the information that was provided.

THE COURT: All right. As I indicated, I'm going to take the matter under advisement. Let me suggest to the parties that this seems to be a case that ought to be settled. I mean no fair-minded person can conclude that Mr. Souter should have been arrested in these circumstances. The EPO had nothing to do with utilities, and yet he was arrested. And I haven't heard the litany of indignities he suffered as a result of being arrested, but I leave that for another time.

It ought to be settled. You all don't need to spend time on this. He shouldn't have been arrested. The only EPO at issue had to do with threats, acts of violence, force, or threats, or criminal offenses. None of which were violated by the defendants or by Souter, by the plaintiff, when the utilities were terminated at her bathroom.

Even assuming that Souter did it, which, of course, is a fact issue I don't have to resolve at this stage. But she clearly doesn't like him and he doesn't like her. This is a landlord/tenant dispute that has erupted beyond that.

By the way, Mr. Glasberg, does she still live there?
MR. GLASBERG: No, sir.

THE COURT: All right. Well, at least there won't be another explosion then.

All right. But it should have been resolved as a

1 landlord/tenant dispute and not as invoking the strong arm of
2 the law to go out there and arrest people.

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- So I recommend to you, Mr. Glasberg and Mr. Krone, that you get together with your clients and see if this matter can be resolved. In any event, I'm taking it under advisement and I will let you know in due course my decision on the pending cross motions for summary judgment and partial summary judgment.
 - Obviously, for the plaintiff, I couldn't get to damages and I can't get to -- excessive use of force is a separate claim under the Fourth Amendment and usually there are factual issues there. But you all --
- MR. GLASBERG: Judge, may I address that just for one second?
- THE COURT: Yeah, do you have a video of it?

 MR. GLASBERG: No, I don't think I need one, because
- if the arrest is impermissible, then no amount of force is appropriate.
- 19 THE COURT: Yes, I saw that in your brief and I'll 20 look at that. I saw that, Mr. Glasberg.
 - MR. GLASBERG: Thank you. That's the only reason that I raise that. I understand that the extent of injury, obviously, is another matter, but it's predicated on a notion that if the arrest is impermissible then no amount of force is permissible.

1 THE COURT: All right. But the amount of force used 2 is actually going to be necessary to establish for damages. 3 MR. GLASBERG: Yes, sir. 4 THE COURT: All right. I thank counsel for your 5 cooperation. I remind you that the best resolution to these 6 things is a settlement. You know the primary duty for every 7 lawyer is to solve his client's problem. If this matter isn't settled, it's going to continue and litigation usually ends up 8 profiting no one but lawyers, not the parties. No matter what 10 happens, even if the defendants were ultimately to prevail, 11 they're going to have to spend a lot of money to litigate this if it's not settled. 12 13 And, of course, if Mr. Glasberg prevails, he would point out to you that he keeps careful track of his time and 14 15 he gets legal fees under 1983. 16 Am I correct, Mr. Glasberg? 17 MR. GLASBERG: Yes, sir, on both counts. 18 THE COURT: All right. Well, you-all do well, stay 19 well during this pandemic. I hope you are doing well. And I 20 will let you hear from me in due course. Thank you-all very 21 much. 22 MR. GLASBERG: Thank you, Judge. 23 MR. KRONE: Thank you, Your Honor. 2.4

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(Proceedings adjourned at 2:55 p.m.)

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

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I, Tonia Harris, an Official Court Reporter for the Eastern District of Virginia, do hereby certify that I reported by machine shorthand, in my official capacity, the proceedings had and testimony adduced upon the Motions hearing in the case of the MATTHEW SOUTER versus C.T. IRBY, et al., Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-1295, in said court on the 9th day of May, 2021.

I further certify that the foregoing 39 pages constitute the official transcript of said proceedings, as taken from my machine shorthand notes, my computer realtime display, together with the backup tape recording of said proceedings to the best of my ability.

In witness whereof, I have hereto subscribed my name, this February 6, 2022.

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Tonia M. Harris, RPR

Official Court Reporter